Sunoco (SUN) did the right thing at the wrong time, at least for me.

Over the many months of the steady decline in equity value, I’ve been asked repeatedly if the time was right to take the plunge. And I always responded with some variation of not yet, noting that Sunoco’s convenience store business was at risk in the event of a significant increase in gas prices.

So of course Sunoco went and sold most of its convenience stores, 1,100 in all to 7-Eleven, with 200 more on the auction block to reposition the partnership as mostly a wholesale distributor (and perhaps as a refinery logistics player.)

The hefty $3.3 billion sale price has been largely earmarked for the paydown of debt with the aim of returning leverage from deeply worrisome to something like acceptable.

Source: Sunoco presentation

And of course the deal got announced last Thursday while I was busy presenting at the Wealth Society summit. That meant I spent part of my weekend poring over Sunoco’s security filings to figure out how the new deal might shake out.

Management says that in addition to the reduced leverage the announced sale and the additional asset disposals to come will preserve the current distribution with a 1.1 coverage ratio.

Which, if true would sure be a pretty sweet deal given that SUN still yields 11.2% even after its 23% rally Thursday and Friday.

I also heard management hem and haw at every turn when asked by analysts to back up its breezy optimism with some numbers. Pro-forma EBITDA after selling off the stores? Sorry, no can do. Expected tax bill? Somewhere in hundreds of millions, maybe. They’ve got preliminary models with lots of unknowns, including the amount of proceeds from remaining store sales and the cost of potential acquisitions to rebuild the cash flow.

Because, as management grudgingly acknowledges, it will need rebuilding, the loss of the convenience stores, even with the new 7-Eleven wholesale supply contract, will cut Sunoco’s EBITDA by nearly 40% and its distributable cash flow by 30%. By my math, that makes management’s pledge to deliver 1.1x coverage on the current distribution a stretch but not a mission impossible. After paying down debt Sunoco would have approximately $640 million in cash to replace perhaps $130 million in forfeited distributable cash flow. If it borrowed as much to buy a refinery logistics partnership for $1.3 billion, that might just work. But, as I said, there are too many unknowns and modest changes in a few of the assumptions can lead one to very different conclusions.

The conclusion I’ve reached is that the 11% yield provides sufficient error margin for speculating on further upside, but not for a long-term commitment.

Beyond the haziness of management’s financial forecast looms existential risk from a general partner whose interests are not aligned with those of the LPs.

Energy Transfer Equity (NYSE: ETE) could opt to reset its incentive distribution rights, thereby diluting current unitholders. Alternatively. Energy Transfer Partners (NYSE: ETP) could sell some or all of its nearly 38% stake in Sunoco’s common units.

But I don’t believe either step is likely in the near term. The less remote risk is simply that Sunoco overpays for an acquisition in its haste to replace the convenience store income. But, again, that’s why the yield’s above 11%. I’m adding SUN to the Aggressive Portfolio with a limit of $33.