Investors Who Can’t Sell Don’t Win
We’re new here. One of us (Robert) came aboard in October and the other (Igor) just a month ago.
Being new has its disadvantages, chief among them the challenge of getting up to speed on a sprawling portfolio that others have assembled over the years.
But it also presents the opportunity to look at everything with fresh eyes, and to make changes without the sentimental attachment we all too often can develop to our own ideas.
That opportunity, and that moment, are at hand and we couldn’t be more excited. Later this month, we’ll be rolling out promising new picks that should power this portfolio this year and beyond. But today is all about clearing out the old.
And as we let go of investments we can no longer stand behind, including some that haven’t performed of late, we relish not just the fresh start but the opportunity to learn from what went wrong.
Take SandRidge Energy (NYSE: SD) and, more to the point, the associated trusts that have been taken to the market woodshed in recent weeks.
The first and most basic lesson is that any investment purporting to offer a double-digit dividend yield in an environment in which the 10-year Treasury pays just 2 percent carries plenty of risk, risk possibly underappreciated by investors craving quarterly distributions.
The second takeaway is that in a business partnership, which is what purchasers of the trusts effectively entered with Sandridge, the credibility of that partner matters a great deal.
The SandRidge Permian Trust (NYSE: PER), SandRidge Mississippian Trust I (NYSE: SDT) and SandRidge Mississippian Trust II (NYSE: SDR) were all sold to investors in their initial public offerings based on targeted distributions, which in turn relied on SandRidge’s estimates of the productive potential of their reserves.
Unjustly ignored at the time were SandRidge’s high financial leverage, profligate spending and self-interest in raising as much financing as possible from these offerings. In recent months, as outsiders have campaigned to oust the CEO and overhaul the board, numerous conflicts of interest and related-party transactions have come to light.
It can hardly be a surprise, in retrospect, that at least one of the trusts is proving much less lucrative than SandRidge’s initial projections purported. Robert has more on SDR’s recent struggles below. The bottom line is that all of the assertions made by SandRidge in the course of marketing its trusts now deserve to be viewed skeptically. And given the wealth of promising energy plays under development by trusted, well-run companies, the SandRidge trusts carry significant opportunity costs. SDR, SDT and PER are now Sells.
Conflicts of interest have also undermined another longtime holding, the Brazilian energy giant Petrobras (NYSE: PBR A). In this case, the conflict arises from the divergence of interests between shareholders, who are understandably concerned with profits, and the government of Brazil, which effectively controls 64 percent of shares and has used that control to further its economic development goals.
This has caused Petrobras’ spending to spin out of control even as its exploration and production have continued to fall short of what’s been promised. Meanwhile, price controls have turned its gasoline refineries into profit drains. A recent Financial Times article had a good rundown of the mounting problems. PBR A is a Sell as well.
We’re not stopping there. The Growth Portfolio also bids good riddance to Baker Hughes (NYSE: BHI) an oil-services giant that’s fallen considerably behind the competition in its space. yet is not as cheap as it might get, given its modest margins.
In general, the toughest discipline for any investor to muster is selling the losers, because it requires owning up to a mistake. Whether the mistake is ours or someone else’s, we believe timely selling is key to long-term performance.
And so we’re done with BG Group (LSE: BG, OTC: BRGYY) and Nordic American Tanker Shipping (NYSE: NAT), which have failed to meet their own forecasts as well as investors’ expectations. The Chesapeake Granite Wash Trust (NYSE: CHKR) is another underperforming trust from an overleveraged company, while the Chesapeake Energy 4.5% Preferred (NYSE: CHK D) offers minimal upside.
There are too many promising and strongly performing energy investments to show undue patience with these names. BHI, BRGYY, NAT, CHKR and CHK D are all Sells from the Growth Portfolio.
In the Conservative Portfolio, we’re bidding goodbye to NuStar Energy (NYSE: NS), a master-limited partnership specializing in the transportation and storage of petroleum and refined products. NuStar is not as diversified as the industry-leading MLPs also recommended in the portfolio, and its higher yield isn’t worth the higher operational risk. Similarly, the higher-yielding PVR Partners (NYSE: PVR) offers undesirable exposure to coal, an energy resource facing serious headwinds. The 7.25% Oasis Petroleum Senior Notes remain a sound proposition given their issuer’s recent successes. But we are not credit analysts and don’t plan to recommend debt issues, so these depart the portfolio as well. The Oasis notes, along with NS and PVR are Sells from the Conservative Portfolio.
Most investors would be well served by giving more thought to selling their underperformers. And most would be better served by not venturing too far afield. Your 40th-best idea in Mongolia is likelier to burn you than to make you rich. And while Australia is hardly Mongolia, the Bakken beckons closer to home. So it’s tata and cheerio to Macmahon Holdings (ASX: MAH, OTC: MCHHF) and Oil Search (ASX: OSH, OTC: OISHF); neither is likely to be missed.
In contrast, Joy Global (NYSE: JOY) and Nabors Industries (NYSE: NBR) are stocks that should have been sold much earlier but offer too much good value to do so at current levels. Both have a lot of upside in a lasting recovery, and also have a chance to be bought out.
Finally, we’re dropping the Hedges Portfolio in its entirety, as we don’t think it’s sensible to “hedge” one’s energy holdings either by concentrating on the struggling natural gas producers or by shorting the S&P 500. The best hedge is a portfolio diversified across a range of industries and asset classes. Sell MCHHF, OISHF, FCG and SH.
That’s 16 names purged, the hardest chore of all but also one crucial to success in the long run. Next time out, as promised, we’ll recommend several promising replacements. But there won’t be 16 of those; we’ll limit new buys to the handful with the best combination of promise and safety. So often, less is more when it comes to investable ideas.
We’re excited to be researching a new crop for your consideration. And we’ll keep refining the the presentation of our price targets to make them as useful as possible in spotting a bargain while encouraging increased exposure to the steady gainers.
Most of all, we want to be of use. And sometimes the most useful thing to do is to sell and move on.
But we continue to be believe that energy stocks and the energy industry have a bright future. Let’s get there together.
Being new has its disadvantages, chief among them the challenge of getting up to speed on a sprawling portfolio that others have assembled over the years.
But it also presents the opportunity to look at everything with fresh eyes, and to make changes without the sentimental attachment we all too often can develop to our own ideas.
That opportunity, and that moment, are at hand and we couldn’t be more excited. Later this month, we’ll be rolling out promising new picks that should power this portfolio this year and beyond. But today is all about clearing out the old.
And as we let go of investments we can no longer stand behind, including some that haven’t performed of late, we relish not just the fresh start but the opportunity to learn from what went wrong.
Take SandRidge Energy (NYSE: SD) and, more to the point, the associated trusts that have been taken to the market woodshed in recent weeks.
The first and most basic lesson is that any investment purporting to offer a double-digit dividend yield in an environment in which the 10-year Treasury pays just 2 percent carries plenty of risk, risk possibly underappreciated by investors craving quarterly distributions.
The second takeaway is that in a business partnership, which is what purchasers of the trusts effectively entered with Sandridge, the credibility of that partner matters a great deal.
The SandRidge Permian Trust (NYSE: PER), SandRidge Mississippian Trust I (NYSE: SDT) and SandRidge Mississippian Trust II (NYSE: SDR) were all sold to investors in their initial public offerings based on targeted distributions, which in turn relied on SandRidge’s estimates of the productive potential of their reserves.
Unjustly ignored at the time were SandRidge’s high financial leverage, profligate spending and self-interest in raising as much financing as possible from these offerings. In recent months, as outsiders have campaigned to oust the CEO and overhaul the board, numerous conflicts of interest and related-party transactions have come to light.
It can hardly be a surprise, in retrospect, that at least one of the trusts is proving much less lucrative than SandRidge’s initial projections purported. Robert has more on SDR’s recent struggles below. The bottom line is that all of the assertions made by SandRidge in the course of marketing its trusts now deserve to be viewed skeptically. And given the wealth of promising energy plays under development by trusted, well-run companies, the SandRidge trusts carry significant opportunity costs. SDR, SDT and PER are now Sells.
Conflicts of interest have also undermined another longtime holding, the Brazilian energy giant Petrobras (NYSE: PBR A). In this case, the conflict arises from the divergence of interests between shareholders, who are understandably concerned with profits, and the government of Brazil, which effectively controls 64 percent of shares and has used that control to further its economic development goals.
This has caused Petrobras’ spending to spin out of control even as its exploration and production have continued to fall short of what’s been promised. Meanwhile, price controls have turned its gasoline refineries into profit drains. A recent Financial Times article had a good rundown of the mounting problems. PBR A is a Sell as well.
We’re not stopping there. The Growth Portfolio also bids good riddance to Baker Hughes (NYSE: BHI) an oil-services giant that’s fallen considerably behind the competition in its space. yet is not as cheap as it might get, given its modest margins.
In general, the toughest discipline for any investor to muster is selling the losers, because it requires owning up to a mistake. Whether the mistake is ours or someone else’s, we believe timely selling is key to long-term performance.
And so we’re done with BG Group (LSE: BG, OTC: BRGYY) and Nordic American Tanker Shipping (NYSE: NAT), which have failed to meet their own forecasts as well as investors’ expectations. The Chesapeake Granite Wash Trust (NYSE: CHKR) is another underperforming trust from an overleveraged company, while the Chesapeake Energy 4.5% Preferred (NYSE: CHK D) offers minimal upside.
There are too many promising and strongly performing energy investments to show undue patience with these names. BHI, BRGYY, NAT, CHKR and CHK D are all Sells from the Growth Portfolio.
In the Conservative Portfolio, we’re bidding goodbye to NuStar Energy (NYSE: NS), a master-limited partnership specializing in the transportation and storage of petroleum and refined products. NuStar is not as diversified as the industry-leading MLPs also recommended in the portfolio, and its higher yield isn’t worth the higher operational risk. Similarly, the higher-yielding PVR Partners (NYSE: PVR) offers undesirable exposure to coal, an energy resource facing serious headwinds. The 7.25% Oasis Petroleum Senior Notes remain a sound proposition given their issuer’s recent successes. But we are not credit analysts and don’t plan to recommend debt issues, so these depart the portfolio as well. The Oasis notes, along with NS and PVR are Sells from the Conservative Portfolio.
Most investors would be well served by giving more thought to selling their underperformers. And most would be better served by not venturing too far afield. Your 40th-best idea in Mongolia is likelier to burn you than to make you rich. And while Australia is hardly Mongolia, the Bakken beckons closer to home. So it’s tata and cheerio to Macmahon Holdings (ASX: MAH, OTC: MCHHF) and Oil Search (ASX: OSH, OTC: OISHF); neither is likely to be missed.
In contrast, Joy Global (NYSE: JOY) and Nabors Industries (NYSE: NBR) are stocks that should have been sold much earlier but offer too much good value to do so at current levels. Both have a lot of upside in a lasting recovery, and also have a chance to be bought out.
Finally, we’re dropping the Hedges Portfolio in its entirety, as we don’t think it’s sensible to “hedge” one’s energy holdings either by concentrating on the struggling natural gas producers or by shorting the S&P 500. The best hedge is a portfolio diversified across a range of industries and asset classes. Sell MCHHF, OISHF, FCG and SH.
That’s 16 names purged, the hardest chore of all but also one crucial to success in the long run. Next time out, as promised, we’ll recommend several promising replacements. But there won’t be 16 of those; we’ll limit new buys to the handful with the best combination of promise and safety. So often, less is more when it comes to investable ideas.
We’re excited to be researching a new crop for your consideration. And we’ll keep refining the the presentation of our price targets to make them as useful as possible in spotting a bargain while encouraging increased exposure to the steady gainers.
Most of all, we want to be of use. And sometimes the most useful thing to do is to sell and move on.
But we continue to be believe that energy stocks and the energy industry have a bright future. Let’s get there together.
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